Securing Taiwan’s Future: Adjusting Foreign Policy to Ensure Long-Term National Security
Author: Michael Mazza Published: 2012-04-27
Michael Mazza is a senior research associate in foreign and defense policy studies at AEI, where he studies US defense policy in the Asia-Pacific, Chinese military modernization, cross-Strait relations, and security on the Korean peninsula. In addition to writing regularly for AEI’s Center for Defense Studies and Enterprise blogs, he is also the program manager for AEI’s annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and Strategy. In his previous capacity as a research assistant at AEI, Mr. Mazza contributed to studies on American strategy in Asia and Taiwanese defense strategy. He worked previously as a policy analyst assistant at SAIC and as an intern at Riskline Ltd., and he has lived and studied in China. Mr. Mazza has written op-eds for the Wall Street Journal Asia, Wall Street Journal India, the Los Angeles Times, the Taipei Times, National Review Online, ForeignPolicy.com, the Weekly Standard, The American, and The Diplomat.
Introduction
During his first term in office, Ma Ying-jeou has pursued what has been, in some respects, a bold foreign policy. While he has continued to pursue traditional objectives such as the maintenance of close ties to the United States and the expansion of Taiwan’s “international space,” Ma has also sought closer ties to the mainland.[1] Although this latter effort built on some of the policies of his predecessor, the defining initiative of his first term in office—the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)—marked a significant departure from the pattern of earlier cross-Strait relations.
The Ma administration pursued this new cross-Strait policy, and ECFA in particular, for three reasons. First, it was thought that expanding and opening economic ties with the mainland would provide a boon to Taiwan’s economic growth. Second, it was hoped that advancing the cross-Strait relationship in this way would enhance regional stability and lead to an easing of Beijing’s rigid Taiwan policy. Third, the policy aimed to reassure the United States—which saw its relationship with Taiwan sour during the Bush-Chen years—that Taiwan is a responsible regional actor, one that is in favor of the status quo.
While cross-Strait tensions have eased during Ma’s presidency and the Obama administration has been supportive of his policies vis-à-vis the mainland, those policies have not been a complete success. ECFA has created some space for Taiwan to begin trade agreement negotiations with other states, but on the whole, China has not relaxed its opposition to Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, nor has it slowed its military buildup across from the island. Washington, meanwhile, has refused to sell Taiwan the weapons it most needs to ensure its defense—Mas has been insistent on Taiwan’s need for new fighter jets and diesel submarines in particular—thus thwarting Ma’s ability to negotiate with China from a position of strength.
Though Ma’s foreign policies may not have succeeded as he hoped, they have certainly not been failures either. Taiwan’s economy is booming and ECFA is likely to contribute to continued economic growth in the coming years. Even given China’s ongoing missile buildup, the Taiwan Strait has been at peace and ties with the mainland are not as fractious as they were under Chen Shui-bian. And while the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security may look questionable, the Washington-Taipei relationship has at least reached a level of stability that it lacked in the last decade.
There is, then, little need for a radical departure from the foreign policy of the current administration. Rather, to enhance Taiwan’s national security, Taipei should make a series of tactical adjustments to that policy. Taipei should take the following steps:
1. make reenergizing its relationship with Washington its foreign policy priority;
2. enhance its relationship with Tokyo;
3. adjust its position on the East China Sea and South China Sea territorial disputes;
4. explore alternative avenues for defense acquisition.
While pursuing each of those initiatives, Taipei should continue its efforts to enhance cross-Strait stability. There is little to be gained from adopting mainland policies that anger Beijing, and a stable Beijing-Taipei relationship will make other countries more comfortable in dealing with Taiwan. Singapore’s decision to begin discussing a trade agreement with Taipei following ECFA’s signing is a case in point.
Reenergize the U.S.-Taiwan Relationship
Since the 1950s, Taiwan has relied on the United States as the ultimate guarantor of its national security. Even following the abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty in 1980, Washington remained Taipei’s primary security partner. In the United States, this was largely due to the efforts of Congress. The legislative branch responded to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China and to the treaty’s abrogation by passing the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires that the United States “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”[2]
But the U.S. and Taiwan seem to have drifted apart in recent years, and Washington’s decades-long security commitment to the island has been increasingly called into question. There are two broad reasons for this development.
Most importantly, China has succeeded in convincing many U.S. foreign policy elites that its cooperation is needed to solve a host of global challenges, from nuclear proliferation to global warming to international financial woes. Beijing has likewise convinced many in Washington that arms sales to Taiwan and other means of support for Taipei make such cooperation less likely. As a Xinhua article noted after the last arms sale in 2010, “the sale is a wrong decision, which not only undermines China’s national security interests and her national unification cause, but also once again hurts the national feelings of the Chinese people. Moreover, it also will cause serious damage to the overall cooperation and relationship between China and the United States.”[3]
This message has been repeatedly conveyed to Washington, seemingly to great effect. The decision against selling new F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan, as reported by Defense News[4] and likely to be officially announced in the coming weeks, certainly resulted not from an assessment that the ROC Air Force does not need the jets, but from an assessment that such a sale would damage Sino-American ties.
The second broad reason for the weakening of U.S.-Taiwan relations has been declining congressional interest in Taiwan. While recent congressional support for arms sales is a positive sign, Taiwan lacks a champion in the U.S. legislature as it had, for example, in Senator Jesse Helms during a previous era. This is due, in part, to the success of Chinese lobbying efforts described above. But it also results from a generational shift in the Senate and especially in the House of Representatives. Many members of Congress now just lack an awareness of Taiwan, an understanding of the history of and rationale for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, and an appreciation for Taiwan’s geopolitical, economic, and military importance for American interests in the Asia-Pacific region.
Fortunately, problems stemming from lack of awareness are not too difficult to redress. Just because newer members of Congress are unfamiliar with Taiwan does not mean that they are unwilling or uneager to learn about the island. The next presidential administration in Taiwan should redouble its congressional outreach program. Such an effort may require a larger staff at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Washington as well as a greater frequency of governmental, military, and non-governmental delegation visits to the U.S. capital.
As has long been the case, U.S.-Taiwan relations will be at their most active and productive when Congress is pressuring the White House to act. But for that pressure to materialize, Taiwan’s government will have to effectively plead its case—not just to members of Congress but to the American public as well. As in Congress, familiarity with Taiwan among the U.S. population has suffered in recent years as well. Part of this is perhaps an “out of sight, out of mind” problem. The “made in China” is label ubiquitous on manufactured goods and consumables in the United States today, but just twenty years ago, many of those products had been made in Taiwan. Unfortunately, many Americans are unaware that Taiwan remains a major U.S. trading partner or that Taiwan plays a key role in the global supply chains of major American corporations such as Apple and Qualcomm.
Taiwan, then, should match its outreach effort to Congress with a public relations campaign in the United States. Both initiatives would aim to educate Americans on the basics:
· Taiwan is a democracy;
· Taiwan has been a loyal partner of the United States for over six decades;
· Taiwan is a top-ten U.S. trading partner;
· mainland China poses a significant military threat to Taiwan, which threatens to undermine American national security and economic interests;
· arms sales to Taiwan create U.S. jobs.
If the American public cares about Taiwan, so will their representatives in Congress. Efforts to educate Americans about the island will also serve the dual purpose of putting the White House on the defensive. Rather than making decisions within the somewhat isolated confines of Washington, DC, the administration will have to defend decisions it makes regarding Taiwan policy to the country as a whole.
Improve Relations with Japan
Taiwan and Japan have long shared a fruitful relationship. While Tokyo, like the United States, does not accord Taipei official diplomatic recognition, Japan may be Taiwan’s second most important foreign partner. For one, the two are large trading partners. But more important is Japan’s potential role in contributing to Taiwan’s defense during a cross-Strait conflict. If the United States wanted to intervene in such a conflict, it would likely rely heavily on its forces stationed in Japan. Tokyo’s acquiescence will be necessary if the United States is to run combat operations out of Japan.
Tokyo does have a natural interest in Taiwan’s continuing de facto independence. An annexed Taiwan would allow China to easily threaten Japan’s southern flank. Clashing strategic, economic, and nationalistic interests foreshadow a more antagonistic future for Sino-Japanese relations, and while Japan has foresworn the use of violence to settle international disputes, China most certainly has not. It will be much more difficult for Japan to defend itself—and for the United States to defend its ally—if the islands face PLA threats emanating from Taiwan.[5]
Still, stable relations with Beijing are important for Japan, which is certainly not eager for a conflict and shares a vital economic relationship with China. Given that, it behooves Taiwan to deepen its relationship with Japan and more tightly tie Japan’s fortunes to its own.
The new Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) provides a unique opportunity for Taipei to do so. Japanese businesses have long faced challenges in doing business in China due to cultural and language differences and widespread anti-Japanese sentiment on the mainland. Those businesses, however, have been much more successful when working with a Taiwanese partner to guide and manage their entrance into the Chinese market. ECFA is making such partnerships an even more attractive option for Japanese firms, as Taiwanese companies can now more easily do business in China than ever before. Such partnerships not only benefit Taiwan economically, but they also serve to boost Japan’s interest in the cross-Strait status quo. The recent visit by a Council for Economic Planning and Development delegation to Japan to promote investment in Taiwanese industries should have similar effects. Attracting Japanese investment in Taiwan should be a priority for the next administration’s foreign and economic policies.
In order to strengthen the Taiwan-Japan relationship, Taipei should also take steps to ameliorate friction resulting from the maritime territorial dispute in the East China Sea. President Ma’s recent statements—that Taipei would not side with Beijing in the dispute and that Taiwan and Japan should shelve the dispute for the time being—were positive signs.[6] But as described below, the next presidential administration can take additional steps to reduce tensions with Japan without sacrificing its sovereignty claims over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku islands.
Maritime Territorial Disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea
Last year’s Japan-China row over an incident in the East China Sea brought the disputes there a heightened and sustained level of international attention. Tensions have likewise been on the rise in the South China Sea in the past eighteen months, as China has more aggressively asserted its claims to disputed territories, and countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have—perhaps to China’s surprise—refused to back down. Indeed, claimant states have demonstrated a strong resolve to resist Chinese pressure. While Taiwan may find it difficult to play a role in solving the East and South China Seas challenges—largely due to its inability to participate in regional forums—Taipei can take steps to ensure that it is not part of the problem.
The Ma administration’s statements on the South China Sea have not always been helpful. Last year’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement on the sea emphasized the following point:
No matter from what perspective one uses—history, geography or international law—one can see that the Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands), Shisha Islands (Paracel Islands), Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Islands), Tungsha Islands (Pratas Islands), as well as their surrounding waters, and respective seabed and subsoil, all consist of the inherent territory of the Republic of China (Taiwan). These archipelagoes without a doubt fall under the sovereignty of the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Therefore, the government reasserts that it enjoys all rights over the islands and their surrounding waters. Furthermore, it cannot accept any claim to sovereignty over, or occupation of, these areas by other countries or territories.[7]
While MOFA statements have also noted Taiwan’s interest in shelving disputes and pursuing joint development of resources, those proposals receive short shrift compared to Taipei’s assertion of its sovereignty rights. That such assertions are as broad and vague as they are may serve to further isolate Taiwan internationally. Other claimants, as well as the United States, which has declared an interest in how disputes are resolved in the South China Sea, will view Taiwan as an irritant. Taiwan will appear to make a resolution more difficult as it insists on inclusion in negotiations over disputed territories when, fairly or not, such inclusion is not possible as long as Beijing maintains its claims.
The fact that Taiwan and China share seemingly similar, if not identical, claims, moreover, will raise suspicions that the two are, in fact, cooperating to settle disputes, or will do so in the future. While such does not actually appear to be the case, perceptions can have important effects; in this case, being tied to China can only hurt Taiwan’s reputation.
Additionally, Taiwan’s expansive claims make the United States nervous for the same reason that China’s do: realization of those claims would make the entire South China Sea the territorial waters of a single country, thus threatening freedom of navigation (for both commercial and military purposes) on a body of water that the United States considers to be high seas. While Taiwan, unlike China, is a friendly partner of the United States, Washington is unlikely to look kindly upon any resolution that does not maintain the South China Sea’s high seas status.
Short of simply dropping its claims, there is little Taiwan can do to completely eliminate tensions with its neighbors over maritime disputes. Still, Taipei can take steps to temper those tensions and to reassure fellow claimants and other interested parties.
First, the next presidential administration should clarify its claims and ensure that those claims are in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This might very well eliminate frictions in areas of the East and South China Seas where the vagueness of Taiwan’s claims has led others to believe there is a dispute where none, in fact, exists. Doing so would also cast Taiwan as a responsible actor in the region, distinguishing it from Beijing in an important way. Even though Taipei’s claims are likely to remain rather extensive, those claims will at least be based on international law. A demonstrated commitment to the rule of law, combined with repeated assurances that Taiwan wishes to resolve conflicts peacefully and multilaterally, will do much to reassure the other claimants.
Second, even though it is not a signatory, Taiwan should announce its intention to adhere to the principles laid out in the 2002 China-ASEAN “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” The purpose, again, would be to reassure Taiwan’s neighbors and earn Taipei some positive attention in the region.
Taipei should be careful not to negate such steps by adopting other, more destabilizing policies. Taiwan need not remove Coast Guard forces from Taiping Island in the Spratlys or halt resupply missions to that South China Sea outpost. But Taipei should freeze plans to have marines train those forces and should put an end to any consideration of replacing the Coast Guard outpost with one manned by marines instead. These more muscular policies would only serve to inflame the situation in the South China Sea, making resolution less likely and actually diminishing Taiwan’s international freedom of action.
Such may seem counterintuitive. One might argue that by throwing its weight around in the South China Sea, Taiwan would force other claimants to take account of Taipei’s position on the disputes and consider how Taipei might react when adopting policies of their own. This is true to a point. The presence of Taiwanese forces in the Spratly islands, for example, will certainly affect decision-making in the capitals of other South China Sea littoral states. But those states will not be more likely to actually negotiate with Taiwan for fear of incurring China’s ire—Beijing simply has much more weight to throw around in the region than does Taiwan.
Instead, a more muscular, more assertive South China Sea policy would threaten the modest gains in “international space” Taiwan has achieved since completing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement last year. In the wake of ECFA’s signing, Taiwan began discussing trade agreements with Singapore and the Philippines, seemingly free of (at least overt) Chinese interference. The warming of cross-Strait relations in recent years reassured others in the region of each side’s commitment to stability. China’s participation in ECFA, meanwhile, signaled an opening to others to pursue similar agreements with Taiwan. But that opening is not necessarily a wide one and even as the Philippines and Singapore have expressed interests in trade agreements with Taiwan, they have done so tentatively and cautiously. Any Taiwanese South China Sea policy that threatens to further destabilize an already tense environment could very well deter Singapore, Manila, and others from engaging in talks with Taipei.
Taiwan should likewise prioritize positive relations with Japan over a muscular East China Sea policy. As discussed above, Taipei has much to gain from positive relations with Tokyo. Moreover, while Washington takes no position on sovereignty claims, it does recognize Japan’s administration of the disputed islands; just last year, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reportedly told Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara that “the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered by the Japan-U.S. security pact, meaning Washington could consider retaliation against a military strike on Japanese territory.”[8] Taiwan can only harm its own relationship with Washington by taking actions that heighten tensions with the United States’ most important Asian ally.
Alternative Avenues for Defense Acquisition
The Obama administration’s decision against selling new F-16 C/Ds to Taiwan—likely to be made official in the coming weeks—throws into stark contrast the security challenge facing Taiwan. As mainland China’s military threat to the island has grown, Taipei’s ability to secure much needed defensive articles has shrunk. As described above, this is largely due to China’s successful lobbying efforts in the United States and a fundamental misunderstanding amongst many U.S. foreign policy elites about how to ensure long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
Given this, Taiwan should once again investigate the possibility of importing arms from other countries. The challenges to doing so are obvious. If the United States will not stand up to Beijing and sell arms to its long-time partner, can others be expected to do so?
Maybe they can. Gary Schmitt, resident scholar and director of advanced strategic studies at the American Enterprise Institute, has recently proposed that Taiwan look into acquiring Saab Gripens from Sweden as an alternative to F-16 C/Ds. He writes:
The unanswered question of course is would Sweden sell the Gripen to Taiwan? There is no way to answer that question for sure, until the government asks, but two things point to a favorable response. The first is that Sweden wants to continue to have its own military aviation industry. However, as things stand now, that is becoming increasingly difficult in the absence of overseas sales of the Gripen—and sales that have been slow to come.
Second, the leverage the Chinese hold over countries by threatening economic ties, is not nearly as significant in Sweden’s case as its exports to, and imports from, China are both less than 4 percent of total trade. Moreover, Swedes typically don’t like to be threatened or bullied.[9]
Nor would France necessarily be opposed to selling the Rafale to Taiwan (which would likely recover from its Mirage hangover quickly if this new French jet was made available). China is not one of France’s top export markets, [10] and Paris has not responded kindly to Chinese threats in the past. In protest of French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s planned meeting with the Dalai Lama in December 2008, Beijing pulled out of the annual EU-China summit. Beijing also issued thinly veiled trade threats in an effort to deter Sarkozy from holding the meeting. To Sarkozy’s credit, these efforts were not successful. France’s foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, asserted that “we cannot have France’s foreign policy dictated to, even by our friends.”[11]
Taiwan should also look into acquiring the Eurofighter, which is produced by a consortium of European defense companies. Taiwan would have to convince each of the four member countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Italy) to sell the jet over Chinese objections, which would seemingly be a difficult task: any one country could veto the sale for fear of putting its relationship with Beijing at risk. On the other hand, a group of European countries might be more comfortable acting together to make the sale than any one country would; there is strength in numbers.
Given the tough economic times facing Europe, moreover, countries like France might find it politically difficult to turn down what would likely be a multi-billion dollar deal; the requested F-16 C/D package has been estimated at a value of US$5.5 billion.[12] For the same reason, Taiwan’s pursuit of alternative options for new F-16s might put additional pressure on the United States to agree to the sale. Schmitt makes this point as well:
Finally, by looking at alternative fighters, Taiwan can offer a sharp reminder to those outside the Obama administration—such as members of Congress from Texas where the F-16s are built—that delays in selling F-16s to Taiwan could cost the US jobs and profits at a time when the domestic economy could use all the help it can get. Indeed, if India selects a jet other than the F-16 in its bid to acquire a new multi-role fighter and the US government continues to delay the sale to Taiwan, then the production line for the F-16 will end soon. Simply put, Taiwan needs to up the pressure on Washington to make a decision.[13]
It is difficult to predict how Taipei’s attempts to identify alternative, willing arms exporters would turn out. But Taipei has little to lose in the effort and the potential upside is well worth the dedication of time and resources. As the cross-Strait military balance continues to shift in Beijing’s favor, it behooves Taiwan to make the attempt.
Conclusion
President Ma Ying-jeou’s tenure thus far has been moderately successful on the foreign policy front. His administration has stabilized relations with both China and the United States and has expanded Taiwan’s space to engage with greater numbers of international partners. Although this stability serves Taiwan’s short-term national security interests, over the longer term the island’s national security appears more questionable. While China has maintained the rapid pace of its military modernization and continued its arms build-up along the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan has been unable to secure the arms it needs most to redress the shifting cross-Strait military balance. Taipei has also been unsuccessful in its continuing efforts to join international organizations such as the United Nations and has witnessed a recent downturn in regional stability as East China Sea and South China Sea disputes have heated up.
While blame for these challenges cannot all be placed at the feet of the current administration, there are steps that President Ma or his potential successor can take to shore up Taiwan’s long-term national security. First among these is to reprioritize the relationship with the United States in Taiwan’s foreign policy. Taiwan cannot directly compete with China when it comes to its economic relationship with the United States. But Taipei can do a better job educating members of Congress—and Americans more generally—about Taiwan, about the US-Taiwan relationship, about Taiwan’s importance for U.S. national security interests, and about the implications for U.S. jobs of arms sales to the island.
Taiwan should likewise focus on shoring up relations with Tokyo. While the two have traditionally shared friendly ties, the relationship has only grown in importance as the military threat to Taiwan has expanded. Taipei should continue to seek expanded economic ties to Japan, both for the economic benefits that will accrue to Taiwan and as a way to deepen Japan’s interest in Taiwan’s continued de facto independence.
In the East and South China Seas, Taiwan should clarify its claims and ensure that they are in line with international law, while avoiding overly assertive, muscular policies. Taking such steps will cast Taiwan as a responsible regional actor, will reassure its neighbors, and will—unlike Beijing’s recent behaviors—contribute to enhanced regional stability.
Finally, Taiwan should seek to import arms from suppliers other than the United States, which is proving itself to be an unreliable arms sales partner. While it is difficult to predict whether such an attempt would be successful, there are reasons for hope. A serious search for an alternative supplier would also serve to put additional pressure on the United States to make sales itself.
While some of these policies—especially those relating to the East China Sea and South China Sea—may be politically difficult to adopt, they hold much promise for securing Taiwan’s future. With a series of adjustments such as these, Taiwan can maintain stable relations with mainland China, the United States, and potential regional partners, while more effectively ensuring its long-term national security interests.
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[1] I include Taiwan’s cross-Strait policies in my discussion of Taiwan’s foreign policy, but this should not be read as implying any position on questions of the island’s sovereignty.
[2] “Taiwan Relations Act,” Taiwan Documents Project, http://www.taiwandocuments.org/tra01.htm (accessed August 22, 2011).
[3] “Arms sale causes severe damage to overall China-U.S. cooperation,” Xinhua, January 30, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-01/30/c_13157364.htm (accessed August 22, 2011).
[4] Wendell Minnick, “U.S. To Deny Taiwan New F-16 Fighters,” Defense News, August 14, 2011, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=7378123&c=ASI&s=TOP (accessed August 22, 2011).
[5] This paragraph is adapted from Michael Mazza, “Why Taiwan Matters,” The Diplomat, March 8, 2011, http://the-diplomat.com/china-power/2011/03/08/why-taiwan-matters/ (accessed August 22, 2011).
[6] “Ma Ying-jeou distances Taiwan from China on Diaoyu Islands,” WantChinaTimes.com, July 22, 2011, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=&id=20110722000112 (accessed August 22, 2011).
[7] “Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China (Taiwan) reiterates its position on the South China Sea,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 29, 2010 http://www.mofa.gov.tw/webapp/ct.asp?xItem=45948&ctNode=1903&mp=6 (accessed August 22, 2011).
[8] “Clinton: Senkakus subject to security pact,” The Japan Times Online, September 25, 2010, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100925a5.html (accessed August 22, 2011).
[9] Gary J. Schmitt, “Taiwan Must Weigh Its Options,” Taipei Times, February 20, 2011, http://www.aei.org/article/103220 (accessed August 22, 2011).
[10] “France,” CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/fr.html (accessed August 22, 2011).
[11] “China warns Sarkozy of fallout from Dalai Lama meeting,” Reuters, December 2, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/02/us-china-france-idUSTRE4B12EK20081202 (accessed August 22, 2011); Matthew Day, “Defiant Nicolas Sarkozy meets Dalai Lama despite China’s trade threat,” The Telegraph, December 6, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/3629865/Defiant-Nicolas-Sarkozy-meets-Dalai-Lama-despite-Chinas-trade-threat.html (accessed August 22, 2011).
[12] J. Michael Cole, “F-16C/D deal for Taiwan dead: report,” Taipei Times, August 15, 2011,http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/08/15/2003510769 (accessed August 22, 2011).
[13] Schmitt.
